Looking Ahead to September: Israel, the EU, and the “Moral Majority” INSS Insight No. 263, June 6, 2011 Stein, Shimon

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Looking Ahead to September: Israel, the EU, and the “Moral Majority” INSS Insight No. 263, June 6, 2011 Stein, Shimon In his appearance before the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the prime minister stated that “no one has the power to stop the decision in September at the UN General Assembly to recognize a Palestinian state. . . We expect to receive support from only a few countries.” In light of the balance of power in the UN, this assessment is not surprising. Since (as it appears today) the chances are slim that the Palestinians will reverse their intention to submit a resolution in September on recognition, the United States and Israel will concentrate their efforts on enlarging the “moral majority,” that is, democratic states that will not support the resolution. The bulk of the effort will presumably focus on members of the European Union and other Western countries. Israel expects these states to use their moral discretion, i.e., abstain or vote against recognition of a Palestinian state. Before assessing prospects for the success of this effort, it is worthwhile to examine Israeli and EU positions on some issues related to the political process and resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The ramifications of the “Arab spring” for the political process: The government of Israel sees the uncertainty regarding developments in the region and the ensuing risks as reason to postpone decisions of a strategic nature. By contrast, the European Union sees the current situation as an opportunity (more urgent than before) to promote the peace process. In a speech to the Security Council in February, for example, the British representative claimed that it would be a disgrace if in light of what was happening in the area Palestinian hopes were not realized. September as a target date for completing negotiations on a permanent agreement: Not only does Israel (correctly) not accept this coming September as a realistic target date – set by the Quartet and President Obama – for completing negotiations on a permanent settlement; it believes that the current circumstances are not ripe for a comprehensive agreement. The European Union, on the other hand, steadfastly repeats the need to conclude negotiations on the two-state solution by September (even now, when it is clear that the chances of meeting the target date are poor) in order to accept Palestine as a full member of the United Nations. An additional reason for the vote in September is connected to the successful (?) completion of the Fayyad plan for state building. The permanent Israeli-Palestinian border: In his speech to Congress, Prime Minister Netanyahu made clear his position rejecting the 1967 lines – for reasons of security and demography – as the basis for a future border. The European Union, however, sees the 1967 lines, including East Jerusalem, as the basis for a future border, with the possibility, if the two parties agree, for equal land swaps. Future security arrangements: The Prime Minister stated that Israel's particular (i.e., small) size demands unique security arrangements. Hence, he argued, the need for a long term Israeli military presence in the Jordan Valley and the full demilitarization of the Palestinian state with on-the-ground security arrangements. The European Union makes do with general statement that security arrangements must respect Palestinian sovereignty and underscore that the occupation has ended, and at the same time ensure Israel's security, inter alia, by preventing the renewal of terrorism and addressing the threats that arise. (When details of the EU position are publicized, they will likely differ sharply from Israel's position.) The Palestinian refugees: In his speech to Congress, the Prime Minister reiterated unequivocally that the problem of the Palestinian refugees must be solved outside the borders of Israel. The European Union argues that it is necessary to find a just, fair, and conclusive solution to the problem. Recognition of Israel's Jewish character: Israel’s condition that it be recognized as a Jewish state does not have the unequivocal support of the European Union, and it is doubtful that it will receive it in the future (Germany, for example, supports recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, but it does not demand this recognition from the Palestinians as a condition for resuming the negotiations. It is possible that France, too, now advocates “two states for two peoples”). Jerusalem: The Prime Minister has argued that Jerusalem must not be divided again and must remain the united capital of Israel. He also said that with creativity and good will, it will be possible to reach a solution to this difficult issue that is acceptable to the Palestinian point of view. The European Union, on other hand, sees the annexation of East Jerusalem and Israel's continued building there as violations of international law, and it believes that Jerusalem’s status as a future capital of the two states must be resolved through negotiations. Internal Palestinian reconciliation: The prime minister called upon/demanded of Abu Mazen that he annul the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation agreement, and he emphasized that Israel will not conduct negotiations with a Palestinian government supported by a Palestinian version of al-Qaeda. The European Union highlights the essential need to repair the internal Palestinian rift as a condition for advancing an agreement. Furthermore, it accepts Abu Mazen’s position that he is the Palestinian representative for political negotiations, while at the same time, it calls on the Palestinian government to accept the Quartet’s conditions (without mentioning the Quartet by name, and without stating that adoption of these conditions is a precondition for discussions). A comparison of their positions thus reveals fundamental gaps between Israel and the European Union, and it is doubtful that they can be overcome in the current circumstances. The EU's hopes that Prime Minister Netanyahu would demonstrate flexibility and openness in front of Congress – which would make possible the renewal of negotiations – were dashed. By contrast, the EU welcomed President Obama's address on the Middle East, which included important elements on the renewal of negotiations. The EU is quite cognizant that the United States plays the leading role in the conflict resolution efforts, and it is eager to coordinate policy with the US. However, the positions of the EU and the US administration are not identical, and the European Union is interested in demonstrating its independence from the United States. In the wake of President Obama's recent policy speech, the EU has made it clear that it will continue to advance its positions on the issues mentioned above. The substantive differences of opinion between Israel and the European Union; the dissatisfaction among more than a few European leaders with the policies and conduct of the Israeli government; impatience in light of the ongoing stalemate; and the (unbalanced) ascribing of responsibility for the stalemate to Israel seemingly suggest that the EU, as a bloc, would support recognition of a Palestinian state (while it continues to endorse September as a target date for the state's establishment). However, it currently appears that this is not likely to happen. German Chancellor Merkel (and a number of other countries, including, apparently, Italy) has decided to oppose the draft resolution, based on opposition to unilateral steps by any one party as a means of solving the conflict. (The Chancellor’s conduct is also an example of the fact that when the desire to demonstrate European Union solidarity conflicts with the national interest, the decision will favor the national interest.) At the same time, the Chancellor’s decision should decidedly not be understood as an expression of support for the policy of the Israeli government. She has expressed her criticism of Israel on a number of occasions in recent months, thereby deviating from her prior media restraint regarding public criticism of Israeli policy. The split in the EU vote ensures that when the moment for the UN vote arrives, Israel will have other opposing votes (or abstentions) on "moral" grounds. However, the government of Israel will err if it sees this as a vote of confidence in its policy. Furthermore, it should be assumed that in light of the gaps between their positions, the dialogue between Israel and the European Union on the day after the vote will be more difficult, because of the possible ramifications resulting from the vote.

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Lebanon: The Arab Spring's Wildcard? INSS Insight No. 266, July 4, 2011 Berti, Benedetta

Lebanon: The Arab Spring's Wildcard? INSS Insight No. 266, July 4, 2011 Berti, Benedetta

     

Following Lebanon's 2005 "Cedar Revolution," which culminated in Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon, many commentators referred to the small Middle Eastern country to Syria's west as a model of successful democratization. The hope was that Lebanon's experience would be emulated by other countries in the region.

However, while the winds of change brought forth by the "Arab spring" have finally reached the rest of the Arab world, Lebanon seems to be struggling to keep both internal stability and the legacy of the 2005 revolution alive. This is particularly true today, as domestic political tensions are rising over the recent indictments issued by the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) against alleged members of Hizbollah. The indictments only add fuel to the sectarian fire within Lebanon, while threatening to further distance the country from the international community and the West.

This uncertain political process began already in early June, with the announcement of the formation of a new executive Cabinet dominated by Hizbollah and its main political allies, the so-called March 8 camp. This development suggested that Lebanon's political path was diverging not only from its own Cedar Revolution, but also from the Arab spring.

On the one hand, the creation of a new Cabinet under PM Najib Mikati was a welcome change for Lebanon, filling the internal power vacuum created by the collapse of Saad Hariri's government in January 2011. However, the composition of the Cabinet, comprising 18 ministries from the so-called March 8 camp and 12 "independent" candidates – and no members of the so-called March 14 coalition – from the outset made it highly problematic.

First, the main concern behind the new Cabinet is that it brings the country back to the pre-Cedar Revolution era, strengthening the influence of Syria on Lebanese domestic politics. Bashar al-Asad's regime was heavily involved in the process that led to the formation of the Hizbollah-dominated executive, and Syria has been highly supportive of the new direction taken by Lebanese politics.

Given Syria's ongoing internal turmoil and the mounting international pressure against the Asad regime, the rise of a friendly pro-Syrian coalition in Lebanon provides Asad with a breath of fresh air. Internationally, Syria can now count on Lebanon's vote in the UN Security Council, where the country is a non-permanent member. What is more, Syria will likely choose to rely heavily on its increasingly strong influence within Lebanon to attempt to restore both its domestic and regional standing. The alliance is in this sense a blow to the Arab spring.

Second, while bringing Lebanon closer to Syria, the new government also threatens to undo some of the post-Cedar Revolution foreign policy trends, including its closer partnership with the United States. With Hizbollah as a dominant force within the new Cabinet and key Christian leader Michel Aoun publicly threatening to “splint the arm of US intelligence in Lebanon,” there are clear reasons to be concerned about the stability of US-Lebanese relations.

The main issue that will likely define the future of this partnership, along with Lebanon's relationship with the international community at large, is the way the new government deals with the recently issued STL indictments. On June 30, 2011, after months of speculations, the UN Special Tribunal finally made public the names of the first four individuals to be indicted in connection with their role in the political assassination of former PM Rafik Hariri. The four suspects are all alleged members of Hizbollah, and they include the brother-in-law of Imad Mughniyeh, Mustafa Badreddin.

Although Mikati had publicly vowed to stand by the country's international commitments, it is extremely unlikely that the new government will be in a position to cooperate fully with the Tribunal. In fact, Hizbollah, now a main political force within the government, has been adamant in denying any links to the murder, while accusing the Tribunal of being an American-Israeli puppet and stating that the organization will not consent to the arrest or trial of any of its members. This position is strongly at odds with Lebanon's international commitments, which in the short term require the country to serve the arrest warrants within 30 days and to arrest and detain the suspects so that they can stand trial.

Although Lebanese Interior Minister Marwan Charbel has stated that the procedures to carry out the arrests have begun, it is highly unlikely that the suspects will indeed be found and detained smoothly. Confirming this widespread uncertainty over the issue, PM Mikati – mindful of Hizbollah and its political allies' refusal to cooperate with the STL and their desire to end any collaboration with the UN body – stated vaguely that Lebanon will "act responsibly" with respect to the indictments, while stressing the need to "preserve stability."

The predicament the PM faces is extremely sensitive: while full compliance with the Tribunal in defiance of Hizbollah's will is out of the question, as this would lead to the collapse of the government; complete defiance risks alienating and angering the March 14's constituency, raising the potential for political paralysis and internal strife.  Moreover, such a crisis would also impact on Lebanon's relations with the UN and the Tribunal's backers, including the US and EU.  

This development is especially problematic because the new government already exacerbates Lebanon's existing sectarian divisions, while de facto marginalizing the political forces that had led the Cedar Revolution. The new Cabinet, formed without the participation of the pro-Western March 14 forces led by former PM Saad Hariri, leaves a large segment of the Lebanese population, and especially the Sunni community, unrepresented. As a result, there is already a rise in internal tensions among the different sectarian groups, thus increasing the potential for violence. This possibility is further confirmed by the recent reports regarding a foiled plot to assassinate Saad Hariri, an act that would have likely catapulted Lebanon back into chaos. In this context, Lebanon's potential refusal to continue its cooperation with the STL could have far-reaching domestic consequences.

From an Israeli perspective, it is too early to assess the ramifications of the current political change within Lebanon. The magnitude and impact of this process will be decided in the months to come, and will depend equally on the internal political process and what role the March 14 forces can play domestically, as well as how the Syrian crisis develops. Similarly, the unfolding of the STL trial will be a crucial factor in determining the future of Lebanon and its main political actors. Specifically, a strong and convincing case against Hizbollah has the potential to substantially weaken the credibility and popularity of the organization, a development that would be certainly welcomed by Israel. At the same time, if Hizbollah manages to dodge the bullet and force the country to end its cooperation with the STL, it will end up strengthened and it will de facto have destroyed its political opposition. In both cases, there is potential for renewed internal strife and instability, which should be seen as a potential security threat for Israel.

 In the short term, the rise of a pro-Syria, Hizbollah-dominated government is also a worrisome trend, although it is unlikely that the new position of political power will lead Hizbollah to modify its long term strategy or seek a military escalation with Israel, as such decisions would likely depend on a set of different (and mostly extra-institutional) factors.